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Abstract
Given the ubiquitous nature of both offensive and defensive missile systems, the
catastrophe-causing potential they represent, and the limited resources available to
countries for missile defense, optimizing the defensive response to a missile attack
is a necessary endeavor. For a single salvo of offensive missiles launched at a set
of targets, a missile defense system protecting those targets must decide how many
interceptors to fire at each incoming missile. Since such missile engagements often
involve the firing of more than one attack salvo, we develop a Markov decision process
(MDP) model to examine the optimal fire control policy for the defender. Due to the
computational intractability of using exact methods for all but the smallest problem
instances, we utilize an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to ex-
plore the efficacy of applying approximate methods to the problem. We obtain policy
insights by analyzing subsets of the state space that reflect a range of possible de-
fender interceptor inventories. Testing of four scenarios demonstrates that the ADP
policy provides high-quality decisions for a majority of the state space, achieving a
7.74% mean optimality gap in the baseline scenario. Moreover, computational effort
for the ADP algorithm requires only a few minutes versus 12 hours for the exact
dynamic programming algorithm, providing a method to address more complex and
realistically-sized instances.
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DETERMINATION OF FIRE CONTROL POLICIES VIA
APPROXIMATE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
I. Introduction
Currently, over 30 countries have inventories of theater ballistic missiles [1] while
an additional 50 employ multiple launch rocket systems [2]. Both of these weapon
systems are capable of causing large amounts of damage and of inflicting a high
number casualities on their targets. The proliferation of these weapon systems has
increased their destructive potential to a worldwide scale while continued research and
development on them has led to the creation of even more capable systems that can
be used by their developers to threaten neighboring countries or demand concessions
in exchange for halting their production. Even U.S. officials concede that, because of
the country’s recent focus on counter-terrorism, other world powers have closed the
gap on guided munitions technology, and the U.S. is now facing the uncertainty of
being able to win a “guided munitions salvo competition” [3].
The threat from these weapons has led to the development and spread of missile
defense systems. One of the best known of these systems is Israel’s Iron Dome. De-
veloped by Israel and funded mostly by the U.S., the Iron Dome boasts a 90% success
rate of destroying incoming rockets headed towards civilian populations, intercepting
over 500 rockets during Operation Protective Edge alone according to Israeli officials
[4]. The U.S.-developed Patriot system has been in service for over 30 years, seeing
use in both Gulf Wars among other conflicts [5], while the system itself has been
acquired by 12 other countries [6]. Israel has exported its Iron Dome technology to
Canada [7] and continues to work closely with India to develop cutting-edge surface-
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to-air missiles (SAM) [8]. Still more countries, like Turkey, are seeking to acquire
long-range missile defense systems [9], and the U.S. continues to push ahead with
missile defense for Europe and Africa [10].
The security these defense systems may provide comes at a significant financial
cost. Initial acquisition costs can be billions of dollars depending on the size and
scope of the order. For example, the cost to equip Qatar with the Patriot missile
defense system in late 2014 was $2.4 billion [11]. Once the system is in place, it must
be modernized periodically to counter the evolution of missile threat systems. South
Korea paid $770 million for a recent upgrade to its missile defense sytem [12]. Finally,
the cost of the interceptor missiles themselves is a large part of the ongoing price of
missile defense. The U.S. recently awarded a $1.5 billion contract to Lockheed Martin
for an order of its latest interceptors [13] while Saudi Arabia has purchased 600 of
the same missiles for $5.4 billion [14].
Given the ubiquitous nature of both offensive and defensive missile systems, the
catastrophe-causing potential they represent, and the limited resources available to
countries for missile defense, optimizing the defensive response to a missile attack is a
valuable endeavor. For a single salvo of offensive missiles launched at a set of targets,
a missile defense system protecting those targets must decide how many interceptors
to fire at each incoming missile. This decision is the well studied static weapon-
target assignment problem. However, missile engagements between an attacker and
defender typically extend over many waves of missile launches by the offense. That
is, the offense does not launch all of its missiles at once. Instead, it launches subsets
of its inventory at selected targets in discrete time periods. Hence, the defense cannot
fire all its interceptors at once; it must hold some number of its inventory back in
consideration of subsequent attack waves. This component of time is a distinguishing
characteristic of the dynamic weapon-target assignment problem.
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Previous work by Han et al. [15] provides a framework for the analysis of Inte-
grated Air Defense System (IADS) location placement and subsequent fire control
decisions. This paper provides two formulations that address optimization within a
multiple-salvo missile engagement setting. Initially, a Markov decision process (MDP)
model is developed from the defender standpoint. MDP models are formulated to de-
scribe sequential decision-making under uncertainty problems using only the current
state of information [16] and are ideally suited to the dynamic weapon-target assign-
ment problem (DWTAP). While the MDP model is inherently a construct for a single
decision maker (in this case, the defender), we incorporate a “smart” attacker into
the formulation to better inform the resulting optimal policy.
Next, we take an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach to deal
with the curses of dimensionality, forced on us by larger problem instances. ADP
provides many useful strategies and algorithms for solving stochastic optimization
problems that are similar to the DWTAP. We apply an approximate policy interation
(API) algorithm utlizing least squares temporal differences (LSTD) to solve several
DWTAP test instances and then analyze these results as compared to the optimal
firing policy.
1.1 Problem Statement
Using the approaches outlined above, we seek a solution to the following problem.
Problem Statement: Given a set of cities C, each with a value vi ∈ R+, i ∈ C, a
set of SAM batteries with corresponding city-covering capabilities, a fixed number of
interceptor missiles at each battery, and a fixed number of attacker missiles, we seek
the best interceptor allocation policy for a defender.
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews relevant
research on the weapon-target assignment problem which informs the methodologies
presented in Chapter III. Chapter III develops the models for the MDP and ADP
approaches. Chapter IV provides analytic results of test instances for both formula-
tions. Chapter V concludes the research presented in this thesis and offers suggestions
for further study.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
The weapon-target assignment problem (WTAP) is a classical operations research
problem of great importance to defense-related operations research applications [17].
Simply stated, the WTAP seeks an optimal assignment of some number of weapons
to some numbers of targets to maximize the total damage inflicted on the targets [18].
Research focus on the WTAP has only increased through the years as threat systems
and platforms proliferate in type and number, to the extent that a weapon-target
assignment system that can efficiently solve WTAPs is now a key component of bat-
tlefield planning [19].
Cheong [20] lists six factors that are common to any WTAP. They are attacker
characteristics, defender characteristics, target characteristics, intelligence available
on the opposing force, scenario, and measures of effectiveness of the allocation strat-
egy. Attacker and defender characteristics are composed of the same parameters,
albeit for opposing sides. Each side could have only one weapon or missile type or a
variety of them. All weapons could perform exactly the same or have higher intercept
probabilities depending on the target to which it is assigned. Strategies are specified
for both attacker and defender. For instance, missiles could be launched in one large
attack or in salvoes that provide the attacker the opportunities to assess success or
failure prior to the next launch.
Target characteristics are customizable as well. The chosen target type, such as a
point or area target, can simplify or complicate a WTAP considerably. Target value is
an important consideration given its role in determining optimality. By manipulating
the defense associated with a target entities such as hardened targets are modeled.
The information that each side has about the other can range from omniscience
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to complete ignorance. Depending on the intelligence-derived situational awareness
each side has regarding the other, many different combinations of WTAP models are
generated. Scenario specifics such as operating in a land- or naval-based environment
or modeling unmanned aerial vehicles or ICBMs add to the diversity of the WTAP
application. Measures of effectiveness to allow comparison of alternate strategies are
chosen based on the problem’s parameters, mathematical tractability, or arbitrarily.
Two significant surveys of WTAP literature are Matlin [21] and Eckler and Burr [22].
Matlin reviews the literature based on a set of five submodel characteristics. Each
characteristic – the weapon system, the target complex, the engagement, the damage
model, and the algorithm – is partitioned alphabetically based on the complexity of
the assumptions within that particular characteristic. Matlin primarily focuses on
asset-based, offensive allocation models, both with single and multiple missile types,
but also includes models that consider the defender’s allocation of interceptors. Eck-
ler and Burr provide an extensive and thorough look at even wider range of models.
Besides allocation models, the authors examine many more technical aspects and
variations of the target-based WTAP model.
Work on the WTAP is traced back to the 1950s and 1960s. Manne [23] devel-
oped a linear programming approximation, while Bradford [24] and Day [25] studied
WTAP modeling issues including its decomposition into subproblems with subsequent
reconstitution. In 1975, Croucher [26] applied game theory to a small antiballistic
missile defense scenario in which the attacker targets 3 defensive assets using a bal-
listic missile which contains 28 multiple reentry vehicles. The defense is allotted 16
weapons for assignment, and each of its assets is assigned a different value. After
first establishing the existence of pure strategies, the instance is solved by finding the
min-max and max-min solutions.
Exact algorithms for some WTAP formulations are proposed in the literature.
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The most well known is found in den Broeder et al. [27], which presents the minimum
marginal return (MMR) algorithm to solve the case of identical weapons. However,
the general WTAP is NP-complete, as proven via a reduction from the exact cover
problem by Lloyd and Witsenhausen [28].
The two fundamental classes of the WTAP are the static and dynamic WTAPs.
According to Xin [29], in a static WTAP, all parameters for the problem are known,
and all weapons are assigned to the targets in a single stage. Comparatively, in
a dynamic WTAP, multiple stages require weapon-target assignments with each of
these stages subsequently evaluated to make future assignment decisions to obtain
the best global assignment.
2.1 Static WTAP
Zeng et al. [30] solves the static WTAP using discrete particle swarm optimization.
The approach leverages advantages from both genetic algorithms and particle swarm
optimization to effect a solution. The authors utilize a mutation strategy, much like
those implemented in genetic algorithms, to prevent the procedure from becoming
trapped in a local optimum. They also discretize the particle swarm optimization
model to apply it towards the WTAP. For a 60-weapon, 60-target test instance the
proposed algorithm converges in the same amount of time to a better solution than
either a standard genetic algorithim or a genetic algorithm with a greedy eugenic.
A genetic algorithm approach by Lee et al. [19] to the static WTAP incorporates a
novel method of gene recombination. The authors express the weapon-target assign-
ment as a chromosome where the position of the gene represents the weapon assigned
and the value of the gene represents the target. Based upon the value of the target
and the probability of the assigned weapon killing the target, the authors label a gene
as “good” if it has the highest such combination of value and kill probability. The al-
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gorithm keeps common “good” genes between two parents and uses them to produce
the next generation of solutions. The authors also propose a “greedy eugenic” which
effectively intensifies the local search for the best solution. The algorithm solves a
120-weapon, 80-target instance with good results.
Madni and Andrecut [18] present simulated annealing and threshold accepting
approaches to the static WTAP. The authors test them against the MMR algorithm
to determine the solution quality. Both of the proposed heuristics solve static WTAP
instances of up to 200 weapons and 200 targets close to optimality in a matter of
seconds.
Wacholder [31] considers a neural network-based approach to solve the static
WTAP. The formulation in this research considers a nonlinear combinatorial optimiza-
tion problem that restricts each weapon platform to assigning only one interceptor per
target. In the neural network representation, Wacholder defines weapon assignment
variables as the output signals of the neurons and defines the objective function (i.e.,
the total expected value of missed targets) and constraints by energy functions. The
developed algorithm produces useful solutions for real-time implementation in com-
bat situations while the structure of the formulation also allows peacetime analysis
of various parameter settings to design an optimal defensive posture.
Ahuja et al. [17] exploit the special structure of the static WTAP to formulate
linear programming, mixed integer programming, network flow, and combinatorial
lower-bounding schemes for proposed algorithms. The authors formulate the stan-
dard nonlinear WTAP as an integer programming problem with a convex objective
function value. They view this formulation as a generalized network flow problem with
convex costs which they approximate by a piecewise-linear convex function so that the
modified problem solution gives a lower bound to the general problem. To obtain the
linear programming-based lower-bounding scheme, Ahuja et al. relax the integrality
8
constraints of the weapon assignment variables. To obtain the mixed integer-based
lower-bounding scheme, the authors maintain the integrality of the weapon assign-
ment variables while transforming the piecewise-linear convex functions to linear cost
functions.
The authors develop a minimum cost flow-based lower-bounding scheme by in-
terpreting the WTAP objective function as maximizing the expected damage to the
targets as opposed to minimizing the survival value of the targets. Using that inter-
pretation, they develop an upper bound by formulating the WTAP as a maximum
cost flow problem. Subtracting the upper bound from the total value of the targets
provides the lower bound.
The authors develop a maximum marginal return-based lower-bounding scheme
by underestimating the survival of a target when hit by a weapon. Instead of allowing
any weapon to hit the target, the authors assume that the best weapon hits the target.
This assumption limits the WTAP to only one weapon type, the best, making any
solution to this formulation a lower-bound on the case including weapon types of
inferior capability.
The authors propose several algorithms for solving the WTAP. They develop and
implement a branch-and-bound algorithm using three of the four lower-bounding
schemes outlined above. They exclude the linear-programming scheme due to its
inability to generate tight bounds. For smaller instances, a breadth-first strategy
produces the best results while for larger instances, the depth-first strategy produces
the best. The proposed branch-and-bound algorithm is the first exact algorithm able
to solve up to an 80-weapon, 160-target instance of the WTAP in moderately good
time.
Ahuja et al. also propose a very large-scale neighborhood (VLSN) search al-
gorithm. Prior to implementing the VLSN algorithm, they employ a construction
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heuristic that solves a sequence of minimum cost flow formulations of the WTAP and
provides a good starting feasible solution. The proposed WTAP VLSN employs cyclic
and path multiexchanges to create neighbors. The multiexchanges allow weapons
to be reassigned from target to target. The algorithm finds mostly two-exchanges,
though searches for up to five-exchanges. For an 80-weapon WTAP instance, this
cyclic exchange search equates to a neighborhood size of about 3 billion solutions.
The authors develop an implicit enumeration algorithm by leveraging the idea of
improvement graphs to accommodate the extreme neighborhood size.
Of the three lower-bounding schemes tested, the mixed integer programming
scheme yields the tightest bounds but produces the longest running times. The min-
imum cost flow-based method gives very tight lower bounds when the number of
weapons is less than the number of targets, whereas the maximum marginal return-
based lower-bounding scheme is computationally efficient but produces not as tight
bounds.
The authors employ their branch-and-bound algorithm with each of the lower-
bounding schemes. For certain instances and schemes, the authors obtain no solu-
tions within 48 hours running time using the minimum cost flow-based and max-
imum marginal return-based lower bounds. However, the branch-and-bound algo-
rithm, when using the mixed integer programming lower-bounding scheme, produces
consistent results in a timely fashion.
While meant to find starting solutions for the VLSN, the construction heuristic
performs extremely well and obtains optimal solutions for over half the test cases.
For instances where the heuristic could not reach optimality, the VLSN either finds
the optimal solution or comes within less than 0.01%. The heuristic and VLSN solves
within 3 seconds test instances of up to 200 weapons and 400 targets, the largest
instance found in the literature.
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2.2 Dynamic WTAP
According to Murphey [32], the dynamic WTAP is formulated in one of two man-
ners. The first model assumes that all targets are known from the start, while the
second assumes that only a subset are known while others may be revealed stochas-
tically. The first formulation is also known as a shoot-look-shoot model and is the
more widely studied. The second formulation allows for additional targets to become
known as time progresses, making the decision problem one of how many weapons
to assign to the known targets and how many to reserve for future targets that may
present themselves. This formulation is a stochastic demand problem and is intro-
duced and studied in Murphey [33]. Ahner and Parson [34] exploit the structure of
the stochastic demand problem to optimally solve a two-stage formulation.
Hosein and Athans [35] present the general dynamic WTAP formulation. Due to
the complexity of the problem, the authors limit the number of stages to two, while
assuming that weapon-target kill probabilities depend only the asset at which the
target is aimed. They develop an upper bound for the optimal value as well as a
heuristic solution method.
As is the case for the static WTAP, heuristic methods are the most common
approach to solving the dynamic WTAP given its computational complexity. Xin
et al. [36] use three rules based on the potential damage of an incoming missile
and potential benefit of a particular interceptor assignment to develop a heuristic
that solves the asset-based, dynamic WTAP. Both Wu [37] and Khosla [38] employ a
genetic algorithm (GA) approach to the dynamic WTAP. Wu’s modified GA approach
allows for the dynamic allocation of weapons to new targets without restarting the
algorithm, thus giving the algorithm more time to find higher quality weapon-target
pairings. Khosla combines a GA with a simulated annealing heuristic to optimize the
weapon-target assignment when faced with resource and timing constraints.
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Lötter and van Vuuren [39] examine four classes of the WTAP to provide support
to the Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assigment Decision Support System (TEWA
DSS). In particular, the authors focus on the optimization of the Weapon Assign-
ment subsystem which is responsible for providing the fire control officer (FCO) with
high-quality assignments of surface-based weapons to airborne threats. The exam-
ined classes, listed in increasing levels of complexity, are the single-objective, static
WTAP; the multi-objective, static WTAP; the single-objective, dynamic WTAP; and
the multi-objective, dynamic WTAP. Assuming models for all WTAP classes are in-
corporated into the TEWA DSS, the authors propose that the FCO utilize a decision
tree in the predeployment stage to configure the Weapon Assignment subsystem.
The authors solve a realistic missile defense scenario using the first three classes
presented. The multi-objective, dynamic class is not modeled. For the static models,
they implement two different genetic algorithms. For the single-objective, dynamic
model, the authors solve with a simulated annealing heuristic. The approach for all
three formulations provides high quality, quickly attained solutions for the FCO to
choose from.
Defended assets are typically of more than a single type or purpose. Hosein
et al. [40] intersperses command, control, and communication (C3) nodes among
the typical defended assets in their model. The authors study this structure for
both dynamic and static WTAPs. Destruction of the C3 system renders the subset
of interceptors under its management useless and increases the vulnerability of the
defended assets. Attacking the C3 nodes is not without risk for the offense as attempts
at these sites leave fewer missile available for targeting the remaining assets. To
demonstrate how the complexity of the WTAP with C3 can grow, the authors impose
kill probability and asset value constraints. They then relax the constraints and
increase the problem instance size. The authors show that model formulation as a
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dynamic versus static WTAP significantly increases the effectiveness of the defense.
Soland [41] uses stochastic dynamic programing to solve an asset-based, dynamic
WTAP. The model formulation is limited to one asset as well as weapon-target kill
probabilities that are the same within each stage. The author provides numerical
results as well as some extensions regarding the number of interceptors remaining for
the defense.
Most dynamic WTAP formulations assume that the defender accurately predicts
the asset that an offensive missile is targeting. Leboucher et al. [42] relax this assump-
tion so that a defender can only tell the particular region that is being targeted; the
region may have one or more assets needing defense. The authors propose a combined
evolutionary game theory and discrete particle swarm optimization approach to solve
the problem, and they provide computional results using numerical simulation.
Karasakal [43] develops an integer linear programming model that also addresses
the defensive effectiveness of a naval task group. The formulation assumes a shoot-
look-shoot policy and considers both point defenses as well as area defenses. Point
defenses intercept only missiles fired directly at the ship they are onboard whereas an
area defense fires at all targets within its range. From the standard nonlinear integer
programming model, Karaskal creates two linear integer programming models using
a logarithmic linearization process. The first model does not guarantee an optimal
assignment solution; it minimizes the total deviation from a desired probability of
not having any attacking missiles leak through the defense. The second model also
does not seek the best weapon-target assignment. Instead, it minimizes the maximum
deviation from the desired probability.
The author randomly generates 36 test instances ranging from 3 to 81 anti-ship
missiles and surface-to-air missiles to test both proposed models. The first model pro-
duces the better results in 22 out of 36 instances whereas the second model performed
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better in six cases. Karaskal performs ten runs each for five of the previous instances
with each model taking less than a second on average to provide an approximate
weapon-target solution.
Bertsekas et al. [44] model a dynamic WTAP that is considerably more complex
than the static WTAP. Instead of making one assignment of weapons to targets,
the defense must decide how many weapons to employ against the current attack
and how many to keep in reserve for subsequent attacks. Since Bellman’s “curse
of dimensionality” denies the possibility of an exact solution for problems of even
moderate size, the authors apply a class of reinforcement learning methods called
neuro-dynamic programming to deal with the dimensionality of the dynamic WTAP.
The neuro-dynamic programming framework for the dynamic WTAP employs sub-
optimal solution methods to approximate the optimal function via neural networks
and simulation. The authors develop four approximate policy iteration methods that
generate a sequence of policies that allow for the approximate evaluation of the op-
timal functions. The approximate policy iteration methods require the potential
solutions to undergo a follow-on screening process to effectively select the best one.
The authors instantiate 23 test cases using three asset types, one missile type, and
one interceptor type, with the number of interceptors and missiles ranging from 40
to 60. Results show that none of the methods dominate the others with tradeoffs
existing among the various policy iterations. Tuning of particular aspects of each is
likely to lead to more efficient solution processes.
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III. Methodology
Joint Publication 3-01 (JP3-01) [45] recognizes two main enemy threats to an
integrated air defense system: air threats (i.e., fighters and bombers) and ballistic
missile (BM) threats. Of the two, BMs are considered more difficult to counter by
offensive targeting since, in general, they have smaller logistical footprints and are
more easily maneuvered and concealed. Since an enemy’s BM assets are unlikely to be
completely destroyed prior to launch, it is essential to devise a defensive strategy to
counter their use. JP3-01 assumes an IADS’s ability to identify and target incoming
BMs to include impact points, and it outlines planning considerations for countering
a BM salvo against a set of defended assets. These considerations – placement of
SAM sites, return salvo size, interceptor inventories, and firing doctrine – attempt to
enable the best possible response to an attack salvo. Since it is reasonable to assume
that an attacker has a limited supply of BMs and a limited number of launchers, it is
also reasonable to assume that an enemy would choose to stage an attack over several
salvos to enable efficient use of limited assets via iterative battle damage assessment
of the defended assets and to allow for reloading and/or repositioning of launchers.
Thus, we view an enemy BM campaign as a series of “look-shoot” engagements.
In our formulation, the defender has a set of cities, each having a value, it wishes
to protect from incoming missiles using a predetermined configuration of SAM sites
with preallocated supplies of interceptors that cannot be replenished. SAM sites are
assumed to be collocated with a city (though not every city may have one) and to
have a predefined protection radius of cities each SAM site could defend. Cities, but
not SAM sites, are assumed to be destroyed if at least one attacking missile targeting
the city is not successfully intercepted. Implied herein is an attacker strategy that
is counter-value focused rather than counter-force focused. The attacker has some
finite number of missiles available for carrying out attacks which may be launched in
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Decision
epoch t
Status/inventory of
each city/SAM site St
Attacker
input M̂t
Change in city status
Ât+1(xt) occurs
Defender
response xt
Attacker
input M̂t+1
Time period t+ 1
Decision
epoch t+ 1
Status/inventory of
each city/SAM site St+1
Figure 1. Diagram outlining the timing of events for the “look-shoot” MDP model.
multiple salvos. The attacker can observe the status of each city prior to launching
an attack. Once an attack is launched, the defense can identify which city has been
targeted by each missile. The defense must then decide how many interceptors to
allocate from among its SAM sites to each incoming missile and how many to keep in
reserve for repelling subsequent BM attacks. We wish to maximize the expected value
of the cities that remain after all attack salvos have been launched. Equivalently, we
wish to minimize the expected total cost of destroyed cities over all decision epochs.
Figure 1 shows a timing diagram of the model.
3.1 MDP Model
The Markov Decision Process (MDP) model is formulated in the following manner.
1. Let T = {1, 2, ..., T}, T ≤ ∞ be the set of decision epochs.
2. The state space consists of three components: the status of each city, the in-
ventory of each SAM site, and the attack “vector”.
(a) The city status component is defined as
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At = (Ati)i∈A ≡ (At1, At2, ..., At|A|),
where A = {1, 2, ..., |A|} is the set of all cities, and Ati ∈ {0, 1}. Ati is the
status of city i ∈ A at decision epoch t with one indicating the city is alive
and zero indicating the city is destroyed.
(b) The SAM inventory status is defined as
Rt = (Rti)i∈A ≡ (Rt1, Rt2, ..., Rt|A|),
where Rti ∈ {0, 1, ..., ri} and ri = initial inventory of interceptors at SAM
site i ∈ A. Rti is the number of interceptors at SAM site i ∈ A at decision
epoch t.
(c) Let M̂t = {1, 2, ..., |M̂t|} be the set of all fired attacker missiles at decision
epoch t. M̂t is the collection of observed incoming BMs that must be
targeted by the defense at time t. The attack “vector” is defined as
M̂t = (M̂ti)i∈A ≡ (M̂t1,M̂t2, ...,M̂t|A|),
where M̂ti ⊆ M̂t is the set of missiles fired at city i at decision epoch t,
and the tuple M̂t forms a disjoint set partition of M̂t. The information
provided by M̂t is available to the defender at time t. However, the arrival
of new information, M̂t+1, is random and could be conditioned on At+1.
Let PM̂t(m) = P(M̂t = m|At) denote the probability distribution of the
attacker BM salvo M̂t. This distribution is conditioned on At meaning that
the battle damage assessment capabilities of an attacker will determine the
likelihood that a particular attack vector arrives to the system.
Using these components, we define St = (At, Rt, M̂t) ∈ S as the state of the
system at decision epoch t, where S is the set of all possible states.
3. At each epoch t, the defender must decide how many interceptors to assign to
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each missile targeting a city. The defender must make this choice from among
the SAM sites that have the given city within their respective protection radii.
From the a priori placement of SAM sites relative to the cities, we can deduce
a coverage matrix for the entire defended area. From this coverage matrix,
we can determine which SAM sites can intercept each incoming missile. Let
xtij ∈ N0 be the number of interceptors fired by SAM site i ∈ A against missile
j ∈ M̂Ati at decision epoch t, where M̂Ati is defined as the set of missiles that
can be intercepted by SAM site i at decision epoch t. Let xt = (xtij)i∈A,j∈M̂Ati
denote our decision vector. We define the set of all feasible defender actions
(i.e., assignment of interceptors to missiles) as
XSt = {xt :
∑
j∈M̂Ati
xtij ≤ Rti, ∀ i ∈ A},
where the constraint
∑
j∈M̂Ati
xtij ≤ Rti ensures that each SAM site i ∈ A cannot
fire more interceptors than it has in inventory.
4. We define transition functions and transition probability functions to charac-
terize how the system evolves from one state to another as a result of deci-
sions and information [46]. The state transition function is defined as St+1 =
SM(St, xt,Wt+1), where Wt+1 = (Ât+1, M̂t+1). Wt+1 represents all the informa-
tion (i.e., city status and attacker BM salvo) that becomes known at decision
epoch t+ 1. We define the city status transition function as
At+1,i =

0 if Ati = 0,
Ât+1,i(xt) otherwise,
∀i ∈ A,
where Ât+1,i(xt) is a random variable representing the status of city i after
salvo M̂t and the interceptor allocation decision xt. This information depends
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on xt since the number of interceptors fired at the inbound BMs affects a city’s
probability of survival. We define the inventory status transition function as
Rt+1,i = Rti −
∑
j∈M̂Ati
xtij, ∀ i ∈ A,
and note that the city status transition function is stochastic whereas the in-
ventory status transition function is deterministic.
The probability of transitioning from state St to St+1 is conditioned on both
the state of the system and the action chosen by the defender at decision epoch
t. We assume the defender has one interceptor type, the attacker has one missile
type, and that any missile that is unintercepted results in the certain destruction
of the targeted city. We define q ∈ (0, 1) to be the probability an attacking
missile survives being targeted by a single interceptor. Then ρtj =
∏
i∈A
qxtij is
the probability that missile j ∈ M̂t survives being targeted by all interceptors
fired against it at decision epoch t. We define
ψti =

∏
j∈M̂ti
(1− ρtj) if M̂ti 6= ∅,
1 if M̂ti = ∅,
as the probability that city i ∈ A survives to decision epoch t+1. Thus Ât+1,i(xt)
follows a Bernoulli probability distribution with parameter ψti. Then
pt(St+1|St, xt) =

PM̂t+1(m)
∏
i∈A
ψ
At+1,i
ti (1− ψti)Ati−At+1,i if Ati ≥ At+1,i and
Rt+1,i = Rti −
∑
j∈M̂Ati
xtij ,
and M̂t+1 = m,
0 otherwise,
is the transition probability function from state St to St+1.
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5. At each decision epoch t, the defender incurs an expected cost as a result of its
decision. We define this cost as Ĉ(St, xt, Ât+1,i) =
∑
i∈A
vi(At − Ât+1,i), where vi
is the value of city i ∈ A. We rewrite the cost function in terms of only the
current state and decision by taking its expected value
C(St, xt) = E
{∑
i∈A
vi(At − Ât+1,i)|St, xt
}
.
To determine the optimal policy, we must find a solution to the Bellman equa-
tions
Jt(St) = min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γE{Jt+1(St+1)|St, xt}). (1)
These equations are alternately referred to as optimality equations or value
functions. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor that represents our
expectation of BM campaign length, or the expected number of decision epochs
T . We note the following relationship
E[T ] =
1
1− γ . (2)
The number of attack salvos for a BM campaign is controlled by the attacker and
not dependent on the defender’s actions. Incorporating an uncertain horizon
allows us to model the randomness of how long a missile engagement may last.
6. Using the reward function, we define the decision function as
Xπt (St) = argmin
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γE{Jt+1(St+1)|St, xt}),
where π represents a policy, or specified defender actions for each state.
We wish to determine the policy π∗ that minimizes the expected total dis-
counted cost of destroyed cities over all epochs. Thus our objective is
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min
π∈Π
Eπ
{
T∑
t=0
γtC(St, X
π
t (St))
}
.
The notation Eπ denotes that the expectation depends on the defender’s chosen
policy.
3.2 ADP Model
The MDP model formulation provides an elegant framework for the interceptor
allocation problem. However, the application of exact dynamic programming algo-
rithms to the problem is limited to very small instances. This limitation exists because
our problem suffers from the curses of dimensionality. For example, consider the di-
mensionality of the state space S, where St = (At, Rt, M̂t) ∈ S is an arbitrary state.
The tuples At, Rt and M̂t represent the status of each city, the status of each SAM
battery’s inventory, and the attack vector at decision epoch t, respectively. Since city
status is binary there are 2|A| possibilities for At. Since SAM batteries are collocated
at cities, there are
∏
i∈A
(ri + 1) possibilities for Rt. Let M be the maximum number
of attacker missiles that can be fired across all cities at any epoch t. That is, the
attacker may fire up to and including M missiles total at each decision epoch. Then
there are
(|A|+M
M
)
possibilities for M̂t. Hence there are 2
|A| · ∏
i∈A
(ri + 1) ·
(|A|+M
M
)
pos-
sibilities for St. This means that given a problem instance of 10 cities and 5 SAM
batteries with 10 interceptors each and an attacker firing up to 10 missiles, we would
have 3 × 1013 possible states. Because classical dynamic programming algorithms
such as policy iteration and value iteration that solve the Bellman equations exactly
rely on enumeration of the state space, all but the smallest problem instances are
computationally intractable.
Approximate dynamic programming (ADP), or computational stochastic opti-
mization, provides an alternative set of solution strategies that can be applied to
problems that suffer from one or more curses of dimensionality. A first key strategy
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of ADP is that of stepping forward in time, in contrast with recursively solving the
Bellman equations, a standard technique. By stepping forward, we can no longer
solve the Bellman equations, which eliminates the need for enumeration of the state
space. Instead of applying backward induction, we simulate the stochastic process
forward, generating samples of possible outcomes and approximating how we make
decisions.
Although stepping forward allows us to handle large state spaces, there remain
other challenges to contend with such as approximating the expectation. A second
key idea of ADP – the construct of a post-decision state variable – allows us to avoid
this step. Van Roy et al. [47] are the first to use this term, while Powell and Van
Roy [48] define the post-decision state variable as the state at time t immediately
after making a decision xt but prior to the arrival of any new information Ŵt+1. The
general state transition function St+1 = S
M(St, xt,Wt+1) can be broken into two steps
Sxt = S
M,x(St, xt),
and
St+1 = S
M,W (Sxt ,Wt+1),
where Sxt is the post-decision state variable. For our problem, the post-decision state
is given by Sxt = (A
x
t , R
x
t ), where A
x
t = (A
x
ti)i∈A and R
x
t = (R
x
ti)i∈A. Let
Axti = ψti
and
Rxti = Rti −
∑
j∈M̂Ati
xtij.
We proceed by rewriting the Bellman equations using the post-decision state vari-
able convention. Let Jxt (S
x
t ) be the value of being in post-decision state S
x
t . Then we
22
can define the relationship between Jt(St) and J
x
t (S
x
t ) with the following equations
Jxt−1(S
x
t−1) = E{Jt(St)|Sxt−1}, (3)
Jt(St) = min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γJ
x
t (S
x
t )), (4)
Jxt (S
x
t ) = E{Jt+1(St+1)|Sxt }
By substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3), we obtain the Bellman equations
around the post-decision state variable
Jxt−1(S
x
t−1) = E
{
min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γJ
x
t (S
x
t ))
∣∣∣Sxt−1}.
The important distinction between this post-decision state form and the standard
form of the Bellman equations from Equation (1) is the swapping of the expectation
and minimum operators. The swap provides computational advantages in that it lets
us avoid approximating the expectation explicitly within the optimization problem,
and it allows us to control the structure of our value function approximations.
Value Function Approximation.
We estimate our value function using regression methods. In linear regression,
the problem is one of estimating a vector to fit a model that will predict a variable
using a set of observations. For our model, we wish to estimate the parameter θ using
observations that are created from a set of basis functions φf (S), f ∈ F . The set
F of basis functions allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the state variable to a
selected number of features |F|. For example, a basis function f ∈ F for our problem
might be the interceptor inventory at a SAM site. Using the post-decision state, we
can write our value function approximation in a form similar to a standard linear
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regression model
J̄xt (S
x
t ) =
∑
f∈F
θfφf (S
x
t ). (5)
Our Bellman equations are then expressed as follows
J̄xt−1(S
x
t−1) = E
{
min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γ
∑
f∈F
θfφf (S
x
t ))
∣∣∣Sxt−1
}
.
We refer to the portion of the Bellman equations inside the expectation operator as
the inner minimization problem, or IMP.
IMP.
Consider the IMP of our formulation
Xπt (St|θ) = min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γ
∑
f∈F
θfφf (S
x
t )). (6)
If we assume θf = 0, ∀f ∈ F , then our IMP is simply the minimization of the one
period cost function
min
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt)),
where C(St, xt) = E
{∑
i∈A
vi(At − Ât+1,i)
}
. Consider a problem instance of one city
and one SAM battery where two attacker missiles have been fired at the city. Then
C(St, xt) = E{v(At − Ât+1)} = vAt − vψ(xt). Since vAt is a constant, we reduce the
IMP to
min
xt∈XSt
(−v(1− qxt1)(1− qxt2)).
Influencing our pending choice of solution methodology and its corresponding efficacy,
we note the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 The integer relaxation of the IMP is not a convex optimization problem.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that the IMP is a convex optimization problem.
Then min
xt∈XSt
(−v(1 − qxt1)(1 − qxt2)) is convex on XSt = {xt : xt1 + xt2 ≤ Rt} and so
the Hessian H(xt1, xt2) of −v(1− qxt1)(1− qxt2) is positive definite on XSt .
Consider the Hessian when Rt = 10. This instance yields
H(xt1, xt2) =
2.59029× 0.2xt1(1− 0.2xt2) −2.59029× 0.2xt1+xt2
−2.59029× 0.2xt1+xt2 2.59029× 0.2xt2(1− 0.2xt1)
.
Now, consider that a feasible solution in XSt : xt1 = 0, xt2 = 1, results in
H(0, 1) =
 2.07223 −0.518058
−0.518058 0
.
Since (2.07223)(0)− (−.518058)2 < 0, by Lemma 3.3.11 of Bazaara et al. [49], H(0, 1)
is not positive definite. 
Due to Theorem 1, both the IMP and its integer relaxation are nonconvex and
hence lack an exact solution method other than exhaustive enumeration of XSt . There-
fore, we invoke MATLAB’s genetic algorithm solver to provide an additional solution
method for the IMP during our analysis.
Algorithmic Strategy.
Approximate policy iteration (API) is an algorithmic strategy that seeks to ap-
proximate the value of a fixed policy within an inner loop and then use that value
to update the policy. To employ this strategy, we need a method of approximating a
policy. Since the value of our policy depends on a value function approximation based
on a linear model (see Equation (5)), we can incorporate a temporal difference (TD)
learning algorithm into the API framework. TD algorithms represent an important
class of ADP solution techniques and have evolved to include a number of variations.
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Least squares temporal differences (LSTD) collects batches of temporal differences
and then uses least squares regression to find the best fit. Thus, we can use LSTD to
evaluate the approximate value of a policy which we then use to improve the policy
iteratively. Algorithm 1 shows API-LSTD adapted to our problem.
The algorithm consists of K policy evaluation loops and N policy improvement
loops. After initializing a θ vector as the representation of a base policy, the policy
evaluation loop begins by generating a random post-decision state. Once the value
φ(Sxt−1,k) is recorded, we simulate forward to the next pre-decision state and select the
best decision as per Equation (6). We record the associated expect cost C(St,k, xt) and
basis function evaluations of the post-decision state, φ(Sxt,k). We obtain K temporal
difference sample realizations where the kth temporal difference given the parameter
vector θn is (C(St,k, xt) + γφ(S
x
t,k)
T θn)− φ(Sxt,k−1)T θn.
The policy improvement loop of the algorithm begins once K temporal difference
sample realizations have been collected. We compactly denote basis function matrices
and cost vectors as follows. Let
Φt−1 ,

φ(Sxt−1,1)
>
...
φ(Sxt−1,K)
>
 , Φt ,

φ(Sxt,1)
>
...
φ(Sxt,K)
>
 , C(St) ,

C(St,1)
...
C(St,K)
 ,
where matrices Φt−1 and Φt are rows of basis function evaluations of the sampled post-
decision states, and C(St) is the cost vector. We perform a least squares regression
of Φt−1 and Φt against C(St) to ensure the sum of the K temporal differences equals
zero and calculate θ̂ as per Equation (7). We update our estimate of θ according to
Equation (8) where αn =
a
a+n−1 , a ∈ (0,∞) denotes our smoothing function. The
smoothing function controls the rate of convergence of the algorithm. Higher values
of the parameter a slow the rate at which αn drops to zero. Smoothing θ completes
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one policy improvement step.
Algorithm 1 LSTD algorithm for infinite horizon problems using basis functions
[46]
Initialization:
Initialize θ0.
Set n = 1.
Set the initial policy:
Xπt (St|θn−1) = argmin
xt∈XSt
(C(St, xt) + γφ(S
M,x(St, xt))
T θn−1)
Do for n = 1, ..., N :
Do for k = 1, ..., K:
Generate random post-decision state Sxt−1,k.
Record φ(Sxt−1,k)
Sample Wt.
Compute the next pre-decision state St,k.
Compute the action xt = X
π
t (St,k|θn−1).
Compute post-decision state Sxt,k = S
M,x(St,k, xt).
Record C(St,k, xt).
Record φ(Sxt,k).
Update θn and the policy:
θ̂ = [(Φt−1 − γΦt)T (Φt−1 − γΦt)]−1(Φt−1 − γΦt)TCt (7)
θn = αnθ̂ + (1− αn)θn−1 (8)
Return Xπt (St|θN) and θN .
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IV. Computational Tests
In this chapter, we propose a baseline missile defense scenario from which we
create four unique test scenarios. We solve each scenario exactly utilizing classical
dynamic programming methods and approximately by employing the ADP solution
methodology described in the previous chapter. Moreover, for each scenario, we
conduct computational experiments to identify the best performance settings for the
ADP algorithm. Further, we compare the optimal and ADP missile defense policies
for selected subsets of the state space to enhance our understanding of the proposed
methodology.
4.1 Scenario
We present a BM defense scenario consisting of three cities defended by two SAM
sites. The SAMs are located at the first and third cities and are positioned in such a
way as to overlap the second, or “middle” city. That is, the first SAM can defend the
first and second cities while the second SAM can defend the second and third cities.
City values are 1, 10, and 5 units, respectively. Each SAM site has a preallocation of
10 interceptors and a firing limit of four interceptors per salvo. We set q = 0.1 and
consider an attacker that can fire up to three missiles per salvo across all cities.
From this baseline scenario, we developed four test scenarios by varying two of the
problem features. The first feature we varied was the expected duration of the conflict,
in terms of the number of expected attack salvos, as indicated by γ. We chose two
γ-values, 0.5 and 0.8, to explore the impact the expected number of salvos would have
on the policies. The second feature we varied was the battlefield damage assessment
(BDA) capabilities of the attacker. BDA settings are either zero, indicating the
attacker has no BDA capabilities, or one, indicating the attacker can identify the
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Table 1. Scenarios
Problem Features
Expected Conflict
Duration
Attacker
BDA
I Long(γ = 0.8) Not Performed (BDA=0)
II Long(γ = 0.8) Performed (BDA=1)
III Short(γ = 0.5) Not Performed (BDA=0)
IV Short(γ = 0.5) Performed (BDA=1)
status of each city prior to launching a missile salvo. For both BDA settings, we
utilize a multinomial probability distribution to characterize the attack salvo. We
assume the attacker fires 1, 2, or 3 missiles in a salvo with equal probability; given
this outcome, when no BDA capability is present (i.e., BDA=0), the probability an
attacker fires at a city is the proportion of the city’s value to the total value of all cities.
When BDA capability is present (i.e., BDA=1), the probability an attacker fires at a
city is the proportion of the city’s value to the total value of the remaining cities. As
an example, if City 1 and City 2 are alive (and City 3 is dead) then when BDA=0,
the multinomial probability distribution is parameterized by the tuple (1/16, 10/16,
5/16). When BDA=1, the multinomial probability distribution is parameterized by
the tuple (1/11, 10/11, 0). Table 1 shows the problem feature settings for each test
Scenario.
4.2 Experimental Design
For each of the four test scenarios, we wish to determine the best parameter
settings for Algorithm 1. We focus on parameters N,K, φ(S), and a. Table 2 shows
the 3-level, 4-factor experimental design while Table 3 shows the set of features for
each design level of the φ(S) factor. The levels for each factor were chosen based on
initial experimental runs of the model.
For each test scenario, we ran a full factorial experiment for 30 random number
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Table 2. Experimental Design
N K φ(S) a
5 50 1 0.01
10 100 2 0.5
15 150 3 1.0
Table 3. Basis Function Features
φ(S) φ0(S) φ1(S) φ2(S) φ3(S) φ4(S) φ5(S)
1 1 At R
x
t
2 1 At R
x
t A
x
t
3 1 Rxt A
x
t (R
x
t )
2 (Axt )
2 RxtA
x
t
seeds for a total of 2430 runs per scenario. For each run, we recorded the mean of the
optimality gap for the states containing the full complement of cities and interceptors.
For each scenario, we chose the settings that yielded the lowest mean value out of
all runs. Table 4 shows the lowest mean optimality gap of the experimental runs for
each scenario. The best performing algorithmic settings for each scenario are shown
in Table 6.
4.3 Analysis
Due the size of the state space, |S| = 16094, we examined subsets of S to gain
insight into the performance of the ADP algorithm. Each of these subsets can be
thought of as a vignette that represents a different starting point for the defender.
Because the most interesting problem features involve the overlapping SAM coverage
of the cities, we only consider vignettes in which all cities are alive. Instead of varying
the city status, we consider a small subset of possible interceptor inventories for both
SAM sites (located at City1 and City 3). We consider the following five interceptor
inventory levels for Rt: (10,0,10), (8,0,2), (5,0,5), (2,0,8) and (2,0,2). Thus, there are
five vignettes. Each vignette represents a decision epoch of interest–a collection of
system states at which all cities are alive (as indicated by At =(1,1,1)), a number of
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Table 4. Experimental Results for Scenario II
Run N K φ(S) a Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV
1 15 50 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
2 5 150 0.01 1 14.86% 15.56% 52.52% 52.77%
3 10 150 1 1 18.78% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
4 15 50 0.5 1 17.27% 15.96% 52.52% 52.76%
5 15 100 0.5 2 19.05% 15.56% 56.31% 56.68%
6 10 100 0.5 2 19.05% 15.56% 56.31% 56.68%
7 5 150 0.5 3 15.29% 31.15% 35.07% 152.76%
8 15 150 1 2 19.04% 15.56% 52.76% 52.97%
9 5 100 0.5 3 18.96% 32.16% 35.70% 142.76%
10 15 150 0.5 1 18.89% 16.78% 52.52% 52.76%
11 15 150 1 1 18.89% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
12 15 100 0.01 2 19.00% 15.56% 53.74% 52.76%
13 15 100 1 3 19.97% 52.04% 35.81% 190.44%
14 5 100 0.5 2 19.00% 15.56% 56.31% 53.01%
15 10 150 0.01 3 19.53% 23.61% 38.02% 59.18%
16 5 50 0.5 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
17 10 50 0.01 3 15.47% 18.52% 47.19% 43.49%
18 10 150 1 3 18.06% 56.30% 33.69% 175.52%
19 15 150 0.5 3 16.23% 45.20% 33.34% 155.69%
20 10 150 0.01 1 14.86% 15.56% 52.52% 52.76%
21 5 150 0.01 3 19.47% 23.83% 37.96% 59.15%
22 15 150 0.01 2 14.97% 15.56% 52.68% 52.97%
23 10 100 0.01 3 19.34% 21.75% 34.97% 51.97%
24 5 150 0.5 1 18.78% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
25 15 50 1 2 19.05% 15.44% 56.31% 56.76%
26 5 50 0.5 2 15.00% 15.63% 52.52% 52.76%
27 5 100 0.01 3 19.35% 21.75% 34.97% 51.63%
28 5 100 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
29 10 100 1 2 18.88% 15.63% 56.31% 52.97%
30 15 50 1 1 18.79% 16.57% 52.53% 52.77%
31 15 100 0.5 1 19.05% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
32 15 150 0.5 2 19.04% 15.56% 52.76% 53.14%
33 10 50 1 1 17.27% 15.96% 52.52% 52.76%
34 10 150 0.5 2 19.04% 15.63% 52.71% 56.68%
35 15 50 0.01 2 14.86% 16.03% 52.68% 56.68%
36 15 50 0.5 3 20.02% 33.72% 40.35% 129.90%
37 5 150 1 3 16.94% 42.98% 35.19% 159.57%
38 5 50 1 3 16.05% 36.91% 35.31% 137.41%
39 10 100 1 3 19.79% 51.98% 34.95% 163.32%
40 15 100 0.01 3 19.34% 21.77% 34.99% 51.97%
41 10 50 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
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Table 5. Experimental Results (Cont.) for Scenario II
Run N K φ(S) a Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV
42 5 50 1 1 14.93% 15.56% 52.52% 52.76%
43 10 150 0.01 2 14.97% 15.56% 52.68% 52.97%
44 10 150 0.5 1 18.89% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
45 5 100 1 1 19.06% 16.59% 52.52% 52.76%
46 10 100 0.5 1 19.05% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
47 5 50 0.01 3 15.46% 18.51% 47.22% 43.40%
48 10 50 0.5 2 17.69% 16.65% 52.76% 52.97%
49 10 100 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
50 15 50 0.01 3 15.58% 18.55% 47.18% 43.51%
51 5 100 1 2 18.78% 15.44% 56.31% 52.76%
52 10 100 1 1 19.05% 15.96% 52.52% 52.76%
53 5 150 0.01 2 14.97% 15.56% 52.76% 52.97%
54 15 150 0.01 3 19.54% 23.62% 38.02% 59.18%
55 5 150 1 1 18.78% 16.59% 52.52% 52.76%
56 15 100 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
57 15 150 0.01 1 14.86% 15.56% 52.52% 52.76%
58 5 150 1 2 17.43% 15.44% 52.76% 56.72%
59 10 50 1 3 21.71% 47.74% 36.91% 150.42%
60 10 150 0.5 3 15.99% 40.72% 35.72% 155.37%
61 5 50 0.01 2 14.86% 16.03% 52.68% 56.68%
62 15 100 1 2 19.05% 15.56% 56.31% 56.72%
63 5 50 0.5 3 18.47% 31.17% 39.76% 123.00%
64 15 100 1 1 19.05% 16.66% 52.52% 52.76%
65 10 50 0.5 3 20.51% 33.14% 38.28% 128.25%
66 10 100 0.01 2 19.00% 15.56% 53.74% 52.76%
67 10 150 1 2 18.94% 15.59% 52.76% 52.97%
68 5 150 0.5 2 18.94% 15.44% 52.70% 56.68%
69 10 100 0.5 3 19.65% 45.44% 34.89% 153.50%
70 15 150 1 3 18.80% 59.14% 32.72% 187.76%
71 5 50 1 2 17.69% 15.44% 52.76% 52.76%
72 5 50 0.01 1 14.86% 15.58% 52.52% 52.76%
73 10 50 1 2 19.00% 15.64% 52.76% 53.01%
74 5 100 0.01 2 19.00% 15.56% 53.74% 52.76%
75 15 50 0.5 2 19.05% 15.66% 52.76% 52.97%
76 10 50 0.5 1 14.86% 15.96% 52.52% 52.76%
77 15 100 0.5 3 21.33% 48.32% 36.76% 157.10%
78 5 100 0.5 1 18.89% 16.57% 52.52% 52.76%
79 15 50 1 3 22.03% 50.62% 35.36% 152.38%
80 5 100 1 3 19.69% 44.99% 34.64% 161.73%
81 10 50 0.01 2 14.86% 16.03% 52.68% 56.68%
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Table 6. Best Algorithm Settings
N K φ(S) a
I 10 50 1 0.01
II 15 50 2 1.0
III 15 150 3 1.0
IV 5 50 3 0.01
interceptors remain in inventory (as indicated by Rt = (10, 0, 10), for example), and
all possible attack vectors (as indicated by M̂t) are represented. We closely examine
the differences between the optimal and ADP policies for test scenario II as it has the
most representative problem settings and compare its policies across the remaining
scenarios.
Test Scenario II Vignettes.
Vignette 1-Full Interceptor Inventories-(Rt = (10, 0, 10)).
Table 7 shows policy results for both the exact and ADP algorithms for each pos-
sible attack vector when the defender has ten interceptors available at each SAM.
Overall, when the system is in a state with At = (1, 1, 1) and Rt = (10, 0, 10), imple-
mentation of the optimal policy results in the expected loss of 4.32. Implementation
of the ADP policy results in the expected loss 4.99, for an optimality gap of 15.44%.
The overall absolute gap of 0.67 from a total city value of 16 at risk is reasonable.
The ADP policy is noticeably more conservative in assigning multiple interceptors
to missiles particularly from the second SAM which reflects a fundamental difference
between the policies. The optimal policy for this vignette is to fire one interceptor per
missile fired at City 1 and fire two interceptors per missile fired at City 2 or City 3.
The optimal policy also assigns interceptors primarily from the first SAM to counter
missiles fired at City 2 unless more than two missiles are inbound. The ADP policy is
to fire one interceptor per missile fired at City 1 and City 3 and fire two interceptors
33
per missile targeting City 2. Thus, the approximate algorithm appears to undervalue
City 3 as compared to the exact algorithm.
We note that the ADP policy agrees with the optimal policy for five out of 19
states, M̂t = (0, 1, 0), (0, 2, 0), (0, 3, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), resulting in optimality gaps of
13.68%, 12.64%, 10.44%, 13.37%, and 11.86%, respectively. The ADP policy chooses
very poorly for three out of 19 states, M̂t = (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2), (2, 0, 1), resulting in
optimality gaps of 97.41%, 77.16%, and 95.59%, respectively. These three states
correspond to attack vectors that fire at least one missile at City 1 and City 3 but
no missiles at City 2. The combined likelihood of these attack vectors is only 0.02,
whereas the combined likelihood for the attack vectors associated with the states that
are in agreement is 0.47.
One non-intuitive decision resulting from the exact policy occurs when the attack
vector is M̂t = (0, 0, 3). The optimal policy chooses to counter the first two missiles
with one interceptor each while firing two interceptors at the third missile. Based on
decisions for other states, we would expect a decision at this state of defending City
3 with two interceptors per missile.
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Table 7. Policy Comparison for Test Scenario II, Rt = (10, 0, 10), At = (1, 1, 1)
P(M̂t) M̂t Optimal Policy Xπ
∗
t ADP Policy X
π
t
Attack
Probability
Attack
Vector
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
J∗ J̄∗
Optimality
Gap
0.1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3.86 4.53 17.41%
0.0326 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.32 5.04 16.69%
0.0102 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 5.01 5.51 9.96%
0.2083 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3.88 4.41 13.68%
0.1302 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 4.32 4.96 14.98%
0.0610 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 4.81 5.49 14.15%
0.1302 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4.34 4.89 12.64%
0.1221 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 4.82 5.46 13.27%
0.0814 0 3 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 4.86 5.36 10.44%
0.0208 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3.72 4.22 13.37%
0.0130 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4.13 8.16 97.41%
0.0061 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4.61 8.16 77.16%
0.0260 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 4.16 4.65 11.86%
0.0244 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 4.62 5.22 12.98%
0.0244 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4.65 5.54 19.17%
0.0013 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.98 4.72 18.55%
0.0012 2 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.41 8.63 95.59%
0.0024 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4.44 5.11 14.97%
0.0001 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.24 4.72 11.20%
E[J∗] E[J̄∗] E[Gap]
4.32 4.99 15.44%
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Vignette 2-Half Full Interceptor Inventories-(Rt = (5, 0, 5)).
Table 8 shows policy results for both the exact and ADP algorithms for each pos-
sible attack vector when the defender has five interceptors available at each SAM site.
Overall, when the system is in a state with At = (1, 1, 1) and Rt = (5, 0, 5), imple-
mentation of the optimal policy results in the expected loss of 7.13. Implementation
of the ADP policy results in the expected loss 7.78, for an optimality gap of 9.11%.
The overall absolute gap of 0.65 from a total city value of 16 at risk is slightly less
than the first vignette.
With the reduced inventories, the optimal policy switches to firing one interceptor
per missile fired at City 1 and City 3 and firing two interceptors per missile fired at
City 2 while still preferring to assign interceptors from the first SAM. This policy is the
same one closely followed by the ADP policy for the first vignette, i.e., Rt = (10, 0, 10).
In fact, the ADP policy for the second vignette, i.e., Rt = (5, 0, 5) is identical to
the ADP policy from the first. This change in the optimal policy accounts for a
higher number of the identical decisions between the two policies. In this vignette,
the ADP policy agrees with the optimal policy for 13 out of 19 states, but still
performs the worst for the same three attack vectors as in the previous vignette,
(1,0,1),(1,0,2),(2,0,1).
The optimal policy exhibits counterintuitive behavior for the state containing
attack vector M̂t = (0, 3, 0). Instead of firing two interceptors at each missile, it fires
two at the first and second missiles, but only one at the third. Conversely, the ADP
policy fires two interceptors at each missile, a more intuitive decision. Also observed
in this vignette, both the optimal and ADP policies do not defend City 1 against all
attack vectors. Out of the 10 attack vectors that target City 1, the optimal policy
fires protective interceptors against all except two–M̂t = (2, 1, 0), (3, 0, 0)–while the
ADP policy fires interceptors against only five.
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Table 8. Policy Comparison for Test Scenario II, Rt = (5, 0, 5), At = (1, 1, 1)
P(M̂t) M̂t Optimal Policy Xπ
∗
t ADP Policy X
π
t
Attack
Probability
Attack
Vector
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
J∗ J̄∗
Optimality
Gap
0.1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.38 6.88 7.97%
0.0326 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.04 7.53 6.96%
0.0102 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 7.71 8.16 5.75%
0.2083 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6.41 6.98 8.88%
0.1302 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 7.09 7.66 8.06%
0.0610 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 7.77 8.36 7.57%
0.1302 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 7.21 7.86 9.04%
0.1221 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 7.96 8.62 8.32%
0.0814 0 3 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 8.18 8.87 8.45%
0.0208 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.10 6.62 8.57%
0.0130 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.78 9.92 46.44%
0.0061 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7.44 9.92 33.36%
0.0260 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 6.84 7.48 9.39%
0.0244 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 7.54 8.23 9.05%
0.0244 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 7.74 8.53 10.30%
0.0013 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.50 6.95 6.87%
0.0012 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.19 10.25 42.69%
0.0024 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7.23 7.68 6.20%
0.0001 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.56 6.95 5.96%
E[J∗] E[J̄∗] E[Gap]
7.13 7.78 9.11%
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Vignette 3-SAM 1 Inventory High, SAM 2 Inventory Low-(Rt =
(8, 0, 2)).
Table 9 shows policy results for both the exact and ADP algorithms for each
possible attack vector when the defender has eight interceptors available at the first
SAM but only two available at the second. Overall, when the system is in a state
with At = (1, 1, 1) and Rt = (8, 0, 2), implementation of the optimal policy results in
the expected loss of 7.49. Implementation of the ADP policy results in the expected
loss 7.99, for an optimality gap of 6.63%. The overall absolute gap of 0.50 from a
total city value of 16 at risk is the lowest among all vignettes.
With a few exceptions, the optimal policy is the same as it was for the second
vignette, one interceptor to one missile for City 1 and City 3, two interceptors to one
missile for City 2. The ADP policy is identical to that of the first two vignettes with
an exception for the state with attack vector M̂t = (0, 0, 3). In this case, City 3 is
being attacked by more missiles than SAM 2 has interceptors, and the ADP policy
correctly chooses to save its interceptors for a possible future engagement.
The optimal policy again exhibits counterintuitive behavior for the state contain-
ing attack vector M̂t = (0, 3, 0) choosing for this vignette to fire one interceptor each
at the first two missiles but fire two interceptors at the second missile. As before,
the ADP policy still fires two interceptors per missile. The optimal policy also acts
counterintuitively for the attack vector M̂t = (1, 2, 0). For this state, the policy fires
one interceptor at the first missile, one interceptor at the second missile, and two in-
terceptors at the third. In the second vignette, with an inventory of five interceptors
at SAM 2, the exact policy fires an additional interceptor at the second missile from
SAM 2. With only two interceptors available at SAM 2 in this vignette, the optimal
policy does not add the second interceptor.
Also, for the attack vector M̂t = (2, 1, 0), owing to an inventory of eight intercep-
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tors instead of five at SAM 1, the optimal policy chooses to defend City 1 instead
of letting it be destroyed. However, the eight interceptors are not enough for the
optimal policy to choose to defend City 1 when the attack vector is M̂t = (3, 0, 0).
This change in the optimal policy from the last vignette results in a policy-to-policy
match of 12 out of 19 states with the ADP still making the worst decisions for the
same three attack vectors previously identified.
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Table 9. Policy Comparison for Test Scenario II, Rt = (8, 0, 2), At = (1, 1, 1)
P(M̂t) M̂t Optimal Policy Xπ
∗
t ADP Policy X
π
t
Attack
Probability
Attack
Vector
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
J∗ J̄∗
Optimality
Gap
0.1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.92 7.23 4.56%
0.0326 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8.01 8.25 3.02%
0.0102 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.23 9.54 3.35%
0.2083 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6.63 7.07 6.73%
0.1302 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 7.53 7.87 4.59%
0.0610 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 8.60 8.87 3.15%
0.1302 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 7.35 7.89 7.45%
0.1221 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 8.24 8.70 5.59%
0.0814 0 3 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 8.41 9.36 11.34%
0.0208 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.34 6.76 6.53%
0.0130 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7.26 9.81 35.18%
0.0061 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.35 9.81 17.56%
0.0260 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 7.02 7.50 6.78%
0.0244 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 7.91 8.31 5.01%
0.0244 1 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 7.96 8.59 7.97%
0.0013 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.72 7.18 6.96%
0.0012 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.62 10.28 34.90%
0.0024 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7.44 7.82 5.11%
0.0001 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.86 7.18 4.72%
E[J∗] E[J̄∗] E[Gap]
7.49 7.99 6.63%
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Vignette 4-SAM 1 Inventory Low, SAM 2 Inventory High-(Rt =
(2, 0, 8)).
Table 10 shows policy results for both the exact and ADP algorithms for each
possible attack vector when the defender has two interceptors available at the first
SAM site and eight available at the second. Overall, when the system is in a state
with At = (1, 1, 1) and Rt = (2, 0, 8), implementation of the optimal policy results in
the expected loss of 7.12. Implementation of the ADP policy results in the expected
loss 7.89, for an optimality gap of 10.89%. The overall absolute gap of 0.77 from a
total city value of 16 at risk is the highest gap so far but still of good quality.
The optimal policy is still of the same form as the last two vignettes; however,
it now assigns more interceptors from the second SAM in defense of City 2. In
other words, the number of interceptors being fired at each missile is roughly the
same; however, the split of interceptors fired from the SAMs is flipped. The optimal
policy for this vignette remains counterintuitive for the attack vector M̂t = (0, 3, 0)
in a similar manner as the first three vignettes. Additionally, the optimal policy no
longer defends City 1 for attack vectors M̂t = (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0), and (3, 0, 0), allowing
City 1 to be destroyed. An example of this policy is observed for attack vector
M̂t = (2, 1, 0). The optimal policy chooses to have the first SAM fire both of its
remaining interceptors at the missile inbound to City 2 leaving City 1 undefended
and letting the SAM 2 conserve its inventory to protect the more valuable City 2
from future attack salvos.
The ADP policy observed in this vignette differs for the first time from the previous
vignettes. Although it has the same general interceptor-to-missile policy, instead of
utilizing SAM 2 to provide additional defense for City 2, it conserves that SAM’s
inventory at the expense of depleting SAM 1. For example, for the state with attack
vector M̂t = (0, 1, 0), instead of firing one interceptor from each SAM as the optimal
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policy does, the approximate policy fires two interceptors from SAM 1 and none from
SAM 2, leaving City 1 defenseless against future attacks. Similarly, for attack vector
M̂t = (1, 1, 0), the ADP policy fires two interceptors from SAM 1 at the missile
inbound to City 2 while firing none from SAM 2, thus choosing to conserve SAM 2
interceptors for future use over protecting City 1 during from the current attack.
As seen previously, the ADP policy chooses poorly for the three identified states,
but for this vignette it also performs poorly for an additional attack vector of M̂t =
(1, 2, 0). The ADP policy fires two interceptors from both SAM sites at only the first
inbound missile to City 2 ensuring that both City 1 and City 2 are destroyed. The
optimal and ADP policies match exactly for six out of 19 states.
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Table 10. Policy Comparison for Test Scenario II, Rt = (2, 0, 8), At = (1, 1, 1)
P(M̂t) M̂t Optimal Policy Xπ
∗
t ADP Policy X
π
t
Attack
Probability
Attack
Vector
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
J∗ J̄∗
Optimality
Gap
0.1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6.36 6.96 9.45%
0.0326 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.98 7.59 8.78%
0.0102 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 7.58 8.18 7.93%
0.2083 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6.40 7.01 9.47%
0.1302 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 7.08 7.65 7.95%
0.0610 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 7.75 8.32 7.40%
0.1302 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 7.21 7.80 8.29%
0.1221 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 7.96 8.49 6.68%
0.0814 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 8.18 8.86 8.34%
0.0208 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.10 6.68 9.67%
0.0130 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6.76 10.03 48.30%
0.0061 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7.40 10.03 35.53%
0.0260 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 6.84 7.67 12.20%
0.0244 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 7.54 8.30 10.01%
0.0244 1 2 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 7.74 13.36 72.66%
0.0013 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.52 6.97 6.93%
0.0012 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.18 10.31 43.48%
0.0024 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 7.22 7.67 6.29%
0.0001 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.54 6.97 6.62%
E[J∗] E[J̄∗] E[Gap]
7.12 7.89 10.89%
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Vignette5-Low Interceptor Inventories-(Rt = (2, 0, 2)).
Table 11 shows policy results for both the exact and ADP algorithms for each
possible attack vector when the defender has only two interceptors available at each
SAM. Overall, when the system is in a state with At = (1, 1, 1) and Rt = (2, 0, 2),
implementation of the optimal policy results in the expected loss of 10.16. Implemen-
tation of the ADP policy results in the expected loss 10.94, for an optimality gap of
7.62%. The overall absolute gap of 0.78 from a total city value of 16 at risk is the
largest gap among the vignettes.
In this vignette, the optimal policy switches to a one-to-one interceptor-to-missile
policy for all cities. Moreover, the optimal policy switches back to having the first
SAM provide most of the defense for City 2. The optimal policy also makes decisions
in this vignette similar to the decisions of the ADP policy of Vignette 4, wherein City
1 is targeted along with City 2 and City 3. The optimal policy only defends City 1
if it is the only city attacked and even then only if it is attacked with one missile. In
all other cases, City 1 is left undefended in order to provide defensive cover for City 2
either immediately or for subsequent attacks. The ADP policy remains the same as
observed in earlier vignettes as much as inventories allow. That is, the ADP policy
leaves City 1 unprotected so that it can fire two interceptors per incoming missile to
City 2.
The optimal and ADP policies match for 6 out of 19 states, but the ADP policy
still decides badly at three out of four of the previously mentioned attack vectors
M̂t = (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2), (2, 0, 1). The difference in state value is not as extreme as
observed in other vignettes since with so few interceptors remaining at each SAM,
the cities that are initially protected by the optimal policy will likely be destroyed in
one or two more attack salvos.
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Table 11. Policy Comparison for Test Scenario II, Rt = (2, 0, 2), At = (1, 1, 1)
P(M̂t) M̂t Optimal Policy Xπ
∗
t ADP Policy X
π
t
Attack
Probability
Attack
Vector
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
SAM 1
Response
SAM 2
Response
J∗ J̄∗
Optimality
Gap
0.1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 9.07 9.40 3.59%
0.0326 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 10.20 10.42 2.12%
0.0102 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.86 11.31 4.11%
0.2083 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 9.21 9.83 6.71%
0.1302 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 10.19 10.64 4.47%
0.0610 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 11.32 11.94 5.43%
0.1302 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 10.27 11.65 13.47%
0.1221 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 11.22 12.04 7.28%
0.0814 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 11.29 12.10 7.25%
0.0208 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8.82 9.22 4.52%
0.0130 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9.75 11.62 19.11%
0.0061 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10.83 11.62 7.25%
0.0260 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 9.89 10.42 5.44%
0.0244 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 10.82 11.21 3.64%
0.0244 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 10.89 14.60 34.12%
0.0013 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.85 9.40 6.28%
0.0012 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.75 11.87 21.76%
0.0024 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 9.89 10.42 5.44%
0.0001 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.85 9.40 6.28%
E[J∗] E[J̄∗] E[Gap]
10.16 10.94 7.62%
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Analysis Across Scenarios–Vignettes.
Scenario II vs Scenario I.
In Scenario I the expected conflict duration is still long, but BDA is not performed.
For three of the five vignettes, Rt = (10, 0, 10), (8, 0, 2), (2, 0, 2), the optimal policy
for Scenario I is either identical or nearly identical as for Scenario II. In fact, only
one state in the Rt = (8, 0, 2) and Rt = (2, 0, 2) vignettes is different. In both cases,
the optimal policy for Scenario I chooses to not defend City 1 whereas it does defend
City 1 in Scenario II. For the remaining two vignettes, the optimal policy for Scenario
I is slightly more conservative in applying additional interceptors to missiles, as well
as being less protective of City 1 as compared to Scenario II.
As compared to Scenario II, in Scenario I the ADP policy fires more interceptors
for each vignette with most of those interceptors being used to defend City 1. In
Scenario II, the ADP policy did not defend City 1 for a total of 29 states; however, in
Scenario I, the ADP policy defends City 1 for 22 of those 29 states. The ADP policy
shows the same invariance across vignettes that it showed for Scenario II as well as the
same poor performance for the previously noted attack vectors. Overall, the optimal
and ADP policies match for the same number of states, albeit for different states in
the vignettes.
Scenario II vs Scenario IV.
In Scenario IV the expected conflict duration is short while BDA is still per-
formed. As we would expect given the shorter expected horizon, both the optimal
and ADP policies more freely fire interceptors in Scenario IV compared to Scenario
II. At times, the optimal policy fires up to three interceptors per missile when de-
fending City 2. Table 12 shows the total number of additional interceptors fired in
each vignette of Scenario IV for each policy compared to Scenario II. As in Scenario
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II, the optimal policy adjusts for the interceptor inventories while the ADP does not.
For example, the optimal policy fires more total missiles across all states for vignette
Rt = (10, 0, 10), but the roles switch for the remaining vignettes with the ADP policy
outfiring the optimal by 25 interceptors for vignette Rt = (2, 0, 2).
Table 12. Number of additional interceptors fired
Policy
Vignette Optimal ADP
Rt = (10, 0, 10) 24 37
Rt = (5, 0, 5) 15 37
Rt = (8, 0, 2) 5 30
Rt = (2, 0, 8) 18 27
Rt = (2, 0, 2) 2 17
Again, the ADP policy performs poorly for the usual three states; however, since
the expected horizon is much shorter Scenario IV the ADP’s poor performance results
in a much larger optimality gap between the exact and approximate values for those
states. For example, when the attack vector is M̂t = (1, 0, 2), the ADP policy fires four
interceptors at the first inbound missile to City 3 and none at the rest of the missiles,
leaving City 1 and City 3 to be destroyed. This action results in an immediate cost
of six units. In contrast, the optimal policy covers down on all three inbound missiles
with two interceptors each. This decision means that the optimal policy receives a
small expected cost for this salvo.
For Scenario II, the decisions chosen by each policy result in a similar disparity
between the one-period costs. Thus, after one salvo, the difference in cost between
the two policies is relatively large for both scenarios. However, for Scenario IV there
is a much lower probability of cities being destroyed under the optimal policy for the
remaining salvos compared to Scenario II, given that there are two expected salvos
in Scenario IV compared to five in Scenario II. Hence, the cost difference between
the optimal and ADP policies for Scenario IV is unlikely to be reduced. When the
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horizon is longer, as it is for Scenario II, it is likely that even following the optimal
policy will eventually result in the loss of cities. Even though these losses come later
in the conflict, losing them still results in closing the gap between the two policies for
Scenario II as compared to Scenario IV.
Scenario II vs Scenario III.
In Scenario III, the expected conflict is short and BDA is not performed. Com-
paring Scenario II to Scenario III, we see great similarity to the comparison between
Scenarios II and IV. This similarity is due to the optimal policies for Scenarios III
and IV being virtually identical. In fact, both optimal policies fire the same num-
ber of interceptors in each vignette, and the decisions themselves are identical with
the exception of a lone state in vignette Rt = (2, 0, 8). The ADP policies between
Scenarios III and IV differ, but the results are similar.
Across all the scenarios, we observe that the ADP policies are relatively invariant.
That is, the decisions made by the ADP policy do not seem to be influenced by the
different interceptor inventories in each vignette. This behavior stands in contrast to
the behavior of the optimal policies. It is this conflicting behavior that accounts for
the variance in the number of states that match across the two policies for a given
vignette.
We also note that the setting for γ has a much greater influence on the policies
than the setting for BDA. As discussed earlier, the optimal policies of Scenarios I and
II vary only slightly in the number of interceptors fired. This change results from
the different policy decisions made at 12 states across the five vignettes. Between
Scenarios III and IV, the optimal policies are identical with the exception of one
state. However, when γ is varied as it is between Scenarios I and III or II and IV, we
observe 53 and 44 different decisions, respectively. The ADP policies also exhibits a
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larger influence of γ, although there are significantly more decisions that differ among
the sets of approximate policies.
Analysis Across Scenarios–Full State Space.
Table 13 shows the mean optimality gaps for the optimal and ADP policies in
each scenario for the state spaces of each vignette and the entire state space, using
the ADP algorithm settings from Table 6
Table 13. Mean Optimality Gaps
Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3 Vignette 4 Vignette 5 All States
I 14.86% 11.67% 8.71% 11.85% 8.89% 10.96%
II 15.44% 9.11% 6.63% 10.89% 7.62% 7.74%
III 32.72% 20.13% 20.42% 31.20% 17.88% 22.10%
IV 43.40% 29.48% 33.00% 36.47% 21.52% 15.51%
Over all scenarios, the mean optimality gap is lower when taken over the entire
state space. This reflects the good performance of the ADP algorithm for states with
smaller inventories and fewer surviving cities.
Figures 2 through 5 show the number of states in the entire state space that cor-
respond to the absolute value of the difference between the optimal and approximate
values of each state for each scenario. We note that the approximate value for a
majority of states for each scenario falls within 0.5 units of the optimal value.
BDA=0
γ = 0.8
|J∗ − J̄∗| No. of States
0 1324
0.5 8615
1.0 4527
1.5 346
2.0 142
> 2.0 1139
Figure 2. Absolute Value of Difference Scenario I
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BDA=1
γ = 0.8
|J∗ − J̄∗| No. of States
0 1813
0.5 9899
1.0 2671
1.5 527
2.0 239
> 2.0 944
Figure 3. Absolute Value of Difference Scenario II
BDA=0
γ = 0.5
|J∗ − J̄∗| No. of States
0 938
0.5 11251
1.0 1908
1.5 924
2.0 246
> 2.0 826
Figure 4. Absolute Value of Difference Scenario III
BDA=1
γ = 0.5
|J∗ − J̄∗| No. of States
0 1160
0.5 10277
1.0 2652
1.5 872
2.0 383
> 2.0 749
Figure 5. Absolute Value of Difference Scenario IV
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V. Conclusions
As the proliferation of offensive and defensive missile systems continues across the
world, the optimization of a defensive response to a missile attack remains a valuable
endeavor for the U.S. and its allies. Given the likelihood that a BM engagement
would involve more than one missile salvo by an attacker, this thesis presented both
exact and approximate methods for solving the DWTAP.
Across four test scenarios, when compared to the optimal policy, the ADP policy
achieved anywhere from an 8% to 22% expected optimality gap. In addition, for
the vast majority of states in all scenarios, the state values for the ADP policy fell
within 0.5 units of the state values for the exact policy. Analysis also showed that
the γ-parameter influenced the fire control policies of both methods more than the
attacker’s BDA capabilities, and that the ADP policy is invariant unlike the optimal
policy, as the interceptor inventories change, resulting in decision agreement between
the two policies from 4 to 15 out of 19 states in vignettes within the same scenario.
Future research could explore the performance of a reasonable baseline fire control
policy compared with the API-LSTD policy developed in this thesis as well as other
ADP algorithms from the literature. Additionally, one could expand the problem
beyond the computational tractability of exact methods to larger test scenarios with
more cities, greater inventories, and bigger attack salvos to test the scalability of the
applied approximate algorithms.
Another improvement to the model would be the development of a “smarter” at-
tacker. In addition to a BDA capability, an attacker could be enabled with knowledge
of the defender’s interceptor inventories. Varying the quality of both these intelligence
capabilities over a wider range of settings could provide insight as well. Ultimately,
a learning policy for the attacker, one that responds to the defender’s policy, would
provide the most realistic matchup.
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Many of the assumptions in this thesis could also be eliminated through the in-
clusion of multiple missile and interceptor types, introduction of a SAM reload capa-
bility, and/or the addition of the partial destruction of cities. More significant model
changes could include incorporating subsequent targeting of missed missiles within
the same epoch, i.e., a shoot-look-shoot policy, the development of a more complete
IADS structure, and the targeting of IADS nodes by the attacker.
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